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THE TIMING OF CHALLENGES TO 
COMPEL CRITICAL HABITAT 
DESIGNATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT: SHOULD COURTS TOLL THE 
GENERAL FEDERAL STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS? 
Matthew D. Crawford*
Abstract: The Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Fish and Wild-
life Service, is directed by the Endangered Species Act to designate criti-
cal habitat concurrently with the listing of a species as endangered or 
threatened. However, the ESA allows FWS to delay critical habitat desig-
nation upon a finding that designation is not prudent or that it is not de-
terminable. FWS has liberally exercised these exceptions to avoid desig-
nating critical habitat for the majority of listed species. In response, 
citizen groups regularly file suit to compel designation. Difficulties arise 
when the failure to designate occurred more than six years before the 
filed action. Some federal courts hold the general civil statute of limita-
tions, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), bars actions to compel designation. Others 
have relied on principles of equitable tolling to allow actions to go for-
ward. This Note argues that courts should toll the statute of limitations in 
actions to compel designation where FWS made a “not determinable” 
finding because it constitutes a failure to act despite a non-discretionary, 
mandatory duty, but that “not prudent” findings constitute final agency 
action and should start the clock running for statute of limitations pur-
poses. 
Introduction 
 When the Secretary of the Interior (the “Secretary”) lists a plant or 
animal species as threatened or endangered, the Secretary is directed 
by statute to concurrently designate any habitat of such species which is 
considered essential to its conservation.1 In spite of this statutory com-
                                                                                                                      
 
* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2008–09. 
1 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(5)(A)(i)(I), 1532(16), 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) 
(2000). The responsibility for administering the Endangered Species Act (ESA) falls pri-
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mand, the majority of listed species have never been designated critical 
habitat.2 For many of these species, more than six years have passed 
since the Secretary chose not to designate their critical habitat.3 Under 
the general federal statute of limitations for civil actions against the 
United States, plaintiffs are time-barred from filing claims against the 
Secretary to compel designation of these species.4
 This Note discusses whether the statute of limitations should be 
tolled in challenges to the Secretary’s failure to designate critical habi-
tat more than six years after the right of action accrued. Part I provides 
a brief overview of the history and evolution of critical habitat designa-
tion and the controversy surrounding it.5 Part II discusses citizen suits 
to compel critical habitat designation under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), as well as the 
standard of review applied by courts.6 Part III discusses the statute of 
limitations and the continuing-violations doctrine as a device for equi-
table tolling of the statute of limitations.7 Finally, Part IV proposes that 
                                                                                                                      
marily to the Department of Interior (DOI), which passes its responsibilities on to the Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS). 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2008); Patrick Parenteau, An Empirical 
Assessment of the Impact of Critical Habitat Litigation on the Administration of the Endangered 
Species Act 1 (Vt. Law Sch. Faculty Papers, Paper No. 1, 2005), available at http://lsr.nellco. 
org/vermontlaw/vlsfp/Faculty/1 (follow “Download the Paper” hyperlink); U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior, http://www.doi.gov (last visited Mar. 19, 2009). The Department of 
Commerce also carries out responsibilities under the ESA through the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS). 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b); U.S. Department of Commerce, http:// 
www.commerce.gov (last visited Mar. 19, 2009). However, this Note will focus exclusively on 
FWS’s administration of the ESA. The ESA defines “Secretary” as either the Secretary of 
the Interior or Secretary of Commerce. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15). For the purposes of this 
Note, “the Secretary” refers to the Secretary of the Interior. When a habitat is designated 
as critical, the ESA requires that any federal agency consult with the Secretary when plan-
ning to take any action that could result in the destruction or adverse modification of that 
habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); Jack McDonald, Critical Habitat Designation Under the En-
dangered Species Act: A Road to Recovery?, 28 Envtl. L. 671, 681 (1998). 
2 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Critical Habitat: What Is It? 2 (2007), http://www. 
fws.gov/endangered/factsheets/critical_habitat.pdf [hereinafter Critical Habitat: What 
Is It?]. “As of August 15, 2007, critical habitat has been designated for 492 of the 1,351 
U.S. species listed as threatened or endangered.” Id. This is approximately thirty-six per-
cent of listed species. See id. 
3 Parenteau, supra note 1, at 6. At the date of study, Parenteau identified 833 species 
without critical habitat. Id. He found 695 of these species were “either pre-1978 species, 
which are not subject to the ESA’s citizen suit provision, or [were] beyond the six year 
federal statute of limitations . . . .” Id. 
4 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2000). “[E]very civil action commenced against the United 
States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action 
first accrues.” Id.
5 See infra Part I. 
6 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2000); see infra Part II. 
7 See infra Part III. 
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courts should toll the statute of limitations in cases of agency inaction, 
specifically where the Secretary failed to designate critical habitat after 
a “not determinable” finding.8
I. Critical Habitat and Its Importance 
A. The Evolution of Critical Habitat 
1. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 and Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill 
 Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), as passed in 1973, 
required that each federal agency “insure that actions authorized, 
funded, or carried out by them do not . . . result in the destruction or 
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Sec-
retary [of the Interior] . . . to be critical.”9 This reflected Congress’s 
recognition that habitat destruction was one of the two major causes of 
extinction.10 Despite this recognition, Congress chose not to provide 
any criteria, definitions, or procedures to guide determination of criti-
cal habitat, instead leaving these choices to the Department of the Inte-
rior and Department of Commerce and their respective subagencies, 
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries 
Service.11
 FWS took time to announce the critical habitat determination 
standards.12 Although FWS published proposed rulemaking regarding 
critical habitat as early as 1975, these guidelines were not codified until 
1978.13 However, once promulgated, the rules set forth were broadly 
protective of critical habitat.14 Critical habitat was defined as “any air, 
land, or water area . . . and constituent elements thereof, the loss of 
which would appreciably decrease the likelihood of the survival and 
                                                                                                                      
8 See infra Part IV. 
9 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884, 892. 
10 S. Rep. No. 93-307, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990. 
11 George Cameron Coggins & Irma S. Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in Pork Bar-
rels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 Geo. L.J. 1433, 1465 (1982); see Notice 
on Critical Habitat Areas, 40 Fed. Reg. 17,764, 17,764–65 (1975). 
12 See Thomas F. Darin, Designating Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: Habi-
tat Protection Versus Agency Discretion, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 209, 213 (2000). 
13 See id. (citing Interagency Cooperation–Endangered Species Act of 1973, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 870 (1978) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402)). 
14 See McDonald, supra note 1, at 681 (“This was the high-water mark for critical habi-
tat, including not only habitat necessary for survival and recovery, but also habitat neces-
sary for expansion.”).
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recovery of a listed species . . . and may include additional areas for rea-
sonable population expansion.”15 FWS concluded that only ecological 
and biological factors would be considered in the critical habitat de-
termination, expressly concluding that socioeconomic factors were ir-
relevant to the determination.16 Finally, critical habitat was to be desig-
nated whenever the Director of FWS deemed it “necessary and 
appropriate.”17
 These rules proved short-lived in the wake of Tennessee Valley Au-
thority v. Hill, a case concerning the snail darter, an endangered species 
with designated critical habitat in an area of the Little Tennessee River 
threatened by the completion of the Tellico Dam.18 Although the dam 
construction was almost eighty percent complete at a cost of tens of 
millions of dollars, the Supreme Court concluded that the plain lan-
guage of section 7 of the ESA barred any federal action which resulted 
in destruction or modification of the species’s critical habitat.19 In his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Powell predicted that Congress would 
amend the ESA as a result of the decision.20 This prediction was quickly 
proven accurate when Congress amended the ESA that very year.21
2. The 1978 Amendments and the Creation of the “Not Prudent” 
Exception to Critical Habitat Designation 
 The 1978 Amendments to the ESA reflected Congress’s newfound 
recognition that critical habitat had “developed into one of the most 
significant portions of the entire statute.”22 Consequently, the 1978 
Amendments made substantial changes to the criteria, definitions, and 
procedures regarding critical habitat designation.23 One alteration was 
the provision of a new definition of critical habitat out of concern that 
the meaning promulgated by FWS was too expansive.24 Congress speci-
                                                                                                                      
 
15 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1978). 
16 Interagency Cooperation–Endangered Species Act of 1973, 43 Fed. Reg. at 872. 
17 50 C.F.R. § 402.05(a). 
18 See 437 U.S. 153, 161–62 (1978). 
19 See id. at 166, 173–74. 
20 See id. at 210 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
21 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751. 
22 H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9457.
23 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 § 11; see James Salzman, Evolution and 
Application of Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 14 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 311, 
318 (1990) (noting that through these amendments, “the role of critical habitat within the 
ESA was carefully evaluated for the first time”). 
24 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 § 2; H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 25, re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9475; see Darin, supra note 12, at 217; McDonald, supra 
note 1, at 682. In the 1978 Amendments, Congress defined critical habitat as “(i) the spe-
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fied that “critical habitat shall not include the entire geographical area 
which can be occupied by” a listed species.25 Thus, the 1978 Amend-
ments narrowed the definition of critical habitat “to clarify that it does 
not include all of a listed species's potential habitat nor include, by de-
fault, expansion of habitat from the present range of a species.”26
 Additionally, the 1978 Amendments altered the timing of critical 
habitat designation, amending section 4 of the ESA to direct the Secre-
tary to concurrently designate critical habitat “to the maximum extent pru-
dent” at the time of a species’s listing as endangered or threatened.27 In 
part, this alteration addressed complaints about lengthy delays in des-
ignation decisions.28 Prior to 1978, less than half of critical habitat des-
ignations were made concurrently with publication of the listing, and 
the average delay for the others was two years between listing and des-
ignation.29 However, Congress understood that concurrent designation 
posed logistical difficulties and included the “to the maximum extent 
prudent” language to give the Secretary discretion not to designate 
critical habitat concurrently “where it would not be in the best interests 
of the species to do so.”30 This exception was meant to be used spar-
ingly, as Congress felt “[i]t is only in rare circumstances where the 
specification of critical habitat concurrently with the listing would not 
be beneficial to the species.”31
 Finally, in direct response to the fallout from Tennessee Valley Author-
ity v. Hill, Congress also amended the ESA to include consideration of 
                                                                                                                      
cific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed . . . 
on which are found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of 
the species and (II) which may require special management considerations or protection.” 
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 § 2. 
25 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 § 2. 
26 McDonald, supra note 1, at 681–82; see H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 25, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9475; Darin, supra note 12, at 217. 
27 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 § 11 (emphasis added); Endangered 
Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 4, 87 Stat. 884, 886. Since the 1973 Act had been 
silent in this respect, FWS had promulgated a vague standard allowing the Secretary to 
designate critical habitat “whenever necessary and appropriate.” See 50 C.F.R. § 402.05(a) 
(1978). 
28 See Salzman, supra note 23, at 319. 
29 Id. 
30 H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9466.
31 Id. at 17. “The committee intends that in most situations the Secretary will, in fact, 
designate critical habitat at the same time that a species is listed as either endangered or 
threatened.” Id. 
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economic factors in the critical habitat designation analysis.32 This was a 
marked departure from FWS’s standard, which had expressly rejected 
consideration of economic factors.33 Congress required that the Secre-
tary perform a balancing of factors which took into consideration the 
economic impact of designation.34 The Secretary may exclude an area if 
“the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying the 
area as part of the critical habitat.”35 However, the Secretary must desig-
nate such an area if failure to do so would result in a species’s extinc-
tion.36 As described by one commentator, this “changed the designation 
process from a purely biological assessment to a social policy decision.”37
3. The 1982 Amendments and the Creation of the “Not Determinable” 
Exception to Critical Habitat Designation
 The alterations to critical habitat wrought by the 1978 Amend-
ments effectively shut down the listing process.38 Requiring designation 
of critical habitat concurrently with a species’s listing freighted the list-
ing process with the “burdensome economic analysis” imposed upon 
critical habitat designation.39 Congress sought to remedy this gridlock 
by passing the 1982 Amendments to the ESA.40 In the legislative his-
tory, Congress acknowledged that the chief impediment to a speedier 
listing process was requiring critical habitat designation (which re-
                                                                                                                      
32 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 § 11; H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 10, 
17, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9460, 9467; see Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 210 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
33 Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, 43 Fed. Reg. 870, 872 
(1978) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
34 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 § 11. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. In such circumstances, a cabinet-level committee created by the 1978 Amend-
ments known as “the God Squad” could choose to exempt a federal agency from section 7 
and allow for a species’s extinction. Id. § 3; see Robert J. Scarpello, Note, Statutory Redun-
dancy: Why Congress Should Overhaul the Endangered Species Act to Exclude Critical Habitat Desig-
nation, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 399, 408 (2003). “The Committee’s power to extirpate a 
species gave it its holy nickname.” Salzman, supra note 23, at 321 n.50. 
37 See Salzman, supra note 23, at 320. 
38 See McDonald, supra note 1, at 682–83; Salzman, supra note 23, at 321–22. Between 
1978 and 1982, DOI listed less than five percent of the more than 2000 species proposed 
for listing and designated critical habitat for less than one percent of the proposed species 
during the same time period. Salzman, supra note 23, at 322. 
39 See Salzman, supra note 23, at 322. 
40 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411; 
H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 11 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2811. 
2009] Time Limitations on Compelling Critical Habitat Designations 503 
quired analysis of economic factors) with the listing decision (which only 
considered biological criteria).41
 The 1982 Amendments addressed this by providing greater discre-
tion to the Secretary to make the listing decision and critical habitat 
designation separately.42 The new statutory language required the Sec-
retary to designate critical habitat concurrently with the listing decision 
“to the maximum extent prudent and determinable.”43 The addition of 
the word “determinable” provided the FWS with another method of 
delaying critical habitat designation in recognition of the difficulties of 
determining critical habitat within the same time frame allotted for the 
listing decision.44 While Congress required that critical habitat designa-
tion and the listing decision be made within one year of a proposed 
regulation’s publication, Congress further provided discretion to the 
Secretary to issue a “not determinable” finding, which would allow the 
Secretary to list a species without concurrently designating its critical 
habitat for an additional year.45 Once this time had elapsed, the Secre-
tary was required to designate critical habitat based on available data 
“to the maximum extent prudent.”46
4. Current Standards for Critical Habitat Designation 
 As codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1533, the ESA directs the Secretary to 
designate critical habitat for an endangered or threatened species con-
currently with the species’s listing as endangered or threatened “to the 
maximum extent prudent and determinable.”47 The statute directs the 
Secretary to make the listing decision and critical habitat determina-
tion within one year of the proposed rule’s publication.48 If the Secre-
tary concludes that a species’s critical habitat is “not . . . determinable” 
                                                                                                                      
41 H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 11–12, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2811–12. “These 
amendments are intended to expedite the decisionmaking process and to ensure prompt 
action in determining the status of the many species which may require the protections of 
the Act.” H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, at 19 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2860, 2860. 
42 See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982 § 2. 
43 Id. 
44 H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, at 24 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2865; 
H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 19, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2819. 
45 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982 § 2. 
46 Id. 
47 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2000). In order to list a species as endangered and desig-
nate its critical habitat, the Secretary first proposes a regulation by publishing general 
notice and the complete text of the proposed regulation in the Federal Register. Id. 
§ 1533(b)(5). 
48 Id. § 1533(b)(6)(A). 
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at the conclusion of the one-year period, the statute provides that the 
period can be extended “by not more than one additional year.”49 At 
the end of this extension period, the Secretary must designate critical 
habitat “based on such data as may be available at that time . . . to the 
maximum extent prudent.”50
 Absent statutory definitions, FWS has published rules to define the 
“not prudent” and “not determinable” exceptions.51 FWS defines des-
ignation as “not prudent” in the following situations: “(i) [t]he species 
is threatened by taking or other human activity, and identification of 
critical habitat can be expected to increase the degree of such threat to 
the species, or (ii) [s]uch designation of critical habitat would not be 
beneficial to the species.”52 FWS recognizes the power of this excep-
tion, noting in its proposed rule that critical habitat designation “may 
be foregone completely” upon a finding by the Secretary that “such 
designation would not be prudent.”53 Congress had long acknowledged 
the power of the “not prudent” finding and intended that it be used 
rarely.54 Nevertheless, FWS employs it far more regularly than Congress 
anticipated.55
 FWS defines “not determinable” as covering one or both of the 
following situations: “(i) [i]nformation sufficient to perform required 
analyses of the impacts of the designation is lacking, or (ii) [t]he bio-
logical needs of the species are not sufficiently well known to permit 
identification of an area as critical habitat.”56 As noted above, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) requires critical habitat designation within one 
year of a “not determinable” finding.57 Reflective of this deadline, FWS 
observes that while “a finding that Critical Habitat is not determinable 
may delay its designation, [it] does not permanently relieve the Secre-
                                                                                                                      
49 Id. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii). 
50 Id. 
51 Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat; 
Amended Procedures to Comply with the 1982 Amendments to the Endangered Species 
Act, 48 Fed. Reg. 36,062 (proposed Aug. 8, 1983) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424). 
52 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(1) (2008). “In some instances, a critical habitat map provides 
the equivalent of a treasure map for a collector or vandal . . . .” See Salzman, supra note 23, 
at 333. 
53 Amended Procedures to Comply with the 1982 Amendments to the Endangered 
Species Act, 48 Fed. Reg. at 36,063. 
54 H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9467.
55 See Darin, supra note 12, at 224. 
56 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(2). 
57 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2000). 
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tary from making such a designation.”58 However, despite this state-
ment, the years following promulgation of this rule saw the Secretary 
use the “not determinable” finding to justify postponing designation 
indefinitely.59
B. The Ongoing Debate over the Necessity of Critical Habitat 
 The 1982 Amendments ended the listing logjam, but the subse-
quent years have seen an ongoing disparity between the number of 
listed species that have been granted critical habitat and those that have 
not.60 In the decade following the 1982 Amendments, the Secretary 
frequently exercised the “not prudent” exception to list species without 
concurrently designating their critical habitat.61 Between 1980 and 
1988, FWS declined to designate critical habitat for 320 species, con-
cluding that designation would not have been prudent in 317 cases.62 A 
review of listings from 1988 through 1992 revealed a similar trend, with 
FWS declining to designate critical habitat for 174 out of nearly 200 
species, 159 of them due to a “not prudent” finding.63
 This trend was exacerbated in 1995 when Congress withdrew $1.5 
million of FWS’s budget for listing activities and “prohibited the ex-
penditure of remaining appropriated funds for final determinations to 
list species or to designate critical habitat.”64 This virtual “moratorium” 
on listing and critical habitat designation lasted until April 26, 1996 and 
resulted in “a backlog of proposed listings for 243 species.”65 In a 1999 
Notice, FWS reported that only 113 of the 1179 listed species in the 
U.S. had been designated critical habitat.66 The disparity has shrunk 
                                                                                                                      
58 Amended Procedures To Comply With the 1982 Amendments To the Endangered 
Species Act, 48 Fed. Reg. at 36,063. 
59 See Darin, supra note 12, at 229. “Even a cursory review of the Federal Register illus-
trates that FWS delays critical habitat designation far beyond the one-year extension when 
it is ‘not determinable’ at the time of listing.” Id. 
60 See id. at 224; McDonald, supra note 1, at 683; Salzman, supra note 23, at 332–33. 
61 Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Depart-
ments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 277, 303 (1993); Salzman, supra note 23, 
at 332. 
62 Salzman, supra note 23, at 332. 
63 Houck, supra note 61, at 303. 
64 See Darin, supra note 12, at 231. 
65 See id. (quoting Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Listing Prior-
ity Guidance for Fiscal Year 1997, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,475, 64,476 (proposed Dec. 5, 1996) (to 
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17)). 
66 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Notice of Intent to Clarify the 
Role of Habitat in Endangered Species Conservation, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,871, 31,872 ( Jun. 
14, 1999). 
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since then; as of August 15, 2007, FWS reported that critical habitat had 
been designated for 492 of the 1351 U.S. species then listed as threat-
ened or endangered.67 Accordingly, the number of listed species to be 
designated critical habitat has climbed from roughly nine percent in 
1999 to thirty-six percent in 2007.68 FWS acknowledges that this in-
crease is due, in large part, to litigation.69
1. FWS’s Open Disregard for Critical Habitat Designation 
 According to one commentator, FWS’s public statements about 
critical habitat and the extent to which designation has become litiga-
tion-driven reflect an unstated agency policy of avoiding critical habitat 
designation.70 FWS has openly questioned the utility of critical habitat 
designation and expressed its long-held belief that “in most circum-
stances, the designation of ‘official’ critical habitat is of little additional 
value for most listed species, yet it consumes large amounts of conser-
vation resources.”71 In a more recent report, FWS admitted that it “as-
signed a relatively low priority to designating critical habitat.”72 FWS 
maintains that critical habitat designation provides 
little extra protection to most species, and in some cases it can 
result in harm to the species. This harm may be due to nega-
tive public sentiment to the designation, to inaccuracies in the 
initial area designated, and to the fact that there is often a 
misconception among other Federal agencies that if an area is 
outside the designated critical habitat area, then it is of no 
value to the species.73
                                                                                                                      
67 Critical Habitat: What Is It?, supra note 2, at 2. 
68 Id.; Notice of Intent to Clarify the Role of Habitat in Endangered Species Conserva-
tion, 64 Fed. Reg. at 31,872. 
69 The Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 3824 Before the 
H. Comm. on Resources, 109th Cong. 29 (2006) [hereinafter Manson Testimony] (statement of 
Craig Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, U.S. Department of the 
Interior), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_ 
house_hearings&docid=f:23837.pdf. 
70 See Parenteau, supra note 1, at 1–2, & n.6. “[FWS has] taken a hard line position 
against designating critical habitat, not just at the time of listing, but ever.” Id. at 1–2. 
71 Notice of Intent to Clarify the Role of Habitat in Endangered Species Conservation, 
64 Fed. Reg. at 31,872; Kieran F. Suckling & Martin Taylor, Critical Habitat and Recovery, in 1 
The Endangered Species Act At Thirty: Renewing the Conservation Promise 75, 76 
(Dale D. Goble et al. eds., 2006). 
72 Critical Habitat: What Is It?, supra note 2, at 2. 
73 Id. 
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 FWS further argues that its limited resources are more effectively 
used to list more species as endangered or threatened.74 In testimony 
before the House Committee on Resources in 2005, Craig Manson, Assis-
tant Secretary of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, com-
plained that court orders and settlement agreements related to critical 
habitat designations had left the Service with “little ability to prioritize its 
activities to direct resources to listing program actions.”75 Manson had 
previously likened this situation to “an emergency room where lawsuits 
force the doctors to treat sprained ankles while patients with heart at-
tacks expire in the waiting room.”76 FWS’s critical habitat designation is 
almost exclusively a creature of litigation: between 1990 to 2005, 350 out 
of 357 critical habitats designated by FWS were the result of litigation.77
2. Criticism of FWS’s Stance Against Critical Habitat Designation 
 FWS is not the only agency implementing the ESA; the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) also lists species and designates critical 
habitat under the authority of the ESA.78 However, unlike FWS, NMFS 
has expressed ongoing support for critical habitat designation, stating in 
2000 that “[a]ny policy that NMFS agrees to jointly with FWS must 
clearly state that the Services believe that designation of critical habitat 
can provide a significant benefit to listed species if used as intended in 
                                                                                                                      
74 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Endangered Species Act “Broken” —Flood 
of Litigation over Critical Habitat Hinders Species Conservation (May 28, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter 2003 DOI Press Release], available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/pdfs/Criti- 
calhabitat/ch_pressrelease.pdf. “The average cost of designating critical habitat for a spe-
cies is approximately $400,000. The Service could list approximately 2 species for the same 
amount of funds.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Critical Habitat—Questions 
and Answers (May 2003), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/pdfs/Criticalhabi- 
tat/CH_qanda.pdf. 
75 Manson Testimony, supra note 69, at 29. “The Service has stated that because listing 
activities have been driven by court orders and settlements, staff have been unable to focus 
on listing species at the greatest risk of extinction or to undertake a more balanced listing 
program.” U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Endangered Species Program: Information 
on How Funds Are Allocated and What Activities Are Emphasized 23 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02581.pdf. 
76 2003 DOI Press Release, supra note 74. 
77 Parenteau, supra note 1, at 2 n.7. “Each critical habitat designation made since 1997 
has resulted from a court order or a settlement agreement . . . .” U.S. Gen. Accounting 
Office, Endangered Species: Fish and Wildlife Service Uses Best Available Science, 
but Additional Guidance Needed for Critical Habitat Designations 34 (2003), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03803.pdf. 
78 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2000); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2008). 
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the Act.”79 Only seven of the thirty critical habitat designations made by 
NMFS between 1990 and 2005 were “forced by litigation.”80
 Some critics argue that FWS has provided no scientific studies to 
support its claims that critical habitat designation is redundant and 
adds little protection.81 One survey reviewed multiple studies and con-
cluded that “[t]he consistent correlation between critical habitat and 
positive recovery trends across differing datasets and methodologies is a 
strong indication that species with critical habitat are in fact recovering 
faster than those without it.”82 These commentators contend that DOI’s 
position is a legal theory rather than a factual conclusion, and one that 
has been “rejected by numerous federal courts.”83
II. Citizen Suits Under the ESA and Administrative Procedure 
Act To Compel Agency Action 
 The citizen suit provision of the ESA authorizes any person or pri-
vate entity to bring suit to enjoin violations of the ESA.84 One part of 
this provision provides a right of action against the Secretary for failure 
to perform any act or duty which is non-discretionary under section 4 
of the ESA.85 Challenges of agency failure to designate critical habitat 
are often brought under this portion of the ESA citizen suit provision, 
but it is not the only remedy available.86 Although the existence of a 
citizen suit provision in a statutory scheme may sometimes preclude 
application of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), “[n]othing in 
the ESA’s citizen-suit provision expressly precludes review under the 
APA, nor do we detect anything in the statutory scheme suggesting a 
purpose to do so.”87
                                                                                                                      
79 See Parenteau, supra note 1, at 2 n.7. 
80 Id. 
81 Suckling & Taylor, supra note 71, at 76. “In response to a Freedom of Information 
Act request, [DOI] acknowledged possessing no evidence.” Id. 
82 Id. at 86. 
83 Id. at 77. 
84 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000); see H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 7 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9457.
85 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(C); see § 1533. The portion of the citizen suit provision which 
provides for suits against the Secretary for failure to act was created by the 1982 Amendments 
to the ESA. H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, at 35 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2876; 
Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits to Enforce Nondiscretionary Duties, 
10 Widener L. Rev. 353, 367 n.103 (2004). 
86 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175 (1997); see also, e.g., Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 07-CV-358-PK, 2007 WL 4117978, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007); 
Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (W.D. La. 2007). 
87 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 175. 
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A. Standard of Review for Challenges of Agency Action and Inaction 
 While the ESA provides a right of review, it does not provide a 
standard of review.88 Where a statute provides for review but sets forth 
no standards for review, the Supreme Court has held “consideration is 
to be confined to the administrative record and that no de novo pro-
ceeding may be held.”89 In the absence of internal standards, courts 
generally apply the APA standard of review when evaluating challenges 
to agency action under the ESA.90 In circumstances where an agency 
fails to act, section 706(1) of the APA provides that a reviewing court 
must “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed.”91 Where an agency has acted, section 706(2) of the APA pro-
vides a reviewing court with the authority to “hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action” found to be arbitrary and capricious.92
1. What Constitutes Reviewable Agency Action 
 The APA defines agency action as “the whole or a part of an agency 
rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, 
or failure to act.”93 Section 701 of the APA provides that agency action is 
subject to judicial review except where there is a statutory prohibition 
on review or where “agency action is committed to agency discretion by 
law.”94 Both of these exceptions have been construed narrowly, render-
ing most agency actions susceptible to judicial review.95 Moreover, a 
challenge of agency action is only cognizable under the APA if it is made 
reviewable by statute or constitutes “final agency action for which there is no 
                                                                                                                      
88 Or. Nat’l Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007); see 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1540(g). 
89 United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963). 
90 Allen, 476 F.3d at 1036; Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 
1216 (11th Cir. 2002); Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt 146 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 
1998); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 67 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995); Cabinet Mountains Wilder-
ness/Scotchman’s Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
91 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000). 
92 Id. § 706(2). 
93 Id. § 551(13). 
94 Id. § 701(a); see Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 
(1971). 
95 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. To meet the first exception, there must be clear and 
convincing evidence of a legislative intent to restrict access to judicial review. Id. The sec-
ond exception is “very narrow” and applicable only “in those rare instances where ‘statutes 
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’” Id. (citation 
omitted). 
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other adequate remedy in a court.”96 Two conditions must be met for 
agency action to be considered “final.”97 First, the action must constitute 
the “‘consummation’ of the agency’s decision-making process” rather 
than a “merely tentative or interlocutory” step in such a process.98 Sec-
ond, the action must determine rights or obligations, or result in legal 
consequences.99
2. What Constitutes Reviewable Agency Inaction 
 As noted above, a “failure to act” is among the categories of “agency 
action” listed by the APA.100 In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
(SUWA), the Supreme Court established the “limits the APA places upon 
judicial review of agency inaction.”101 The Court held that in order to 
qualify as agency inaction reviewable under the APA, the “failure to act” 
must be “a failure to take an agency action . . . defined in § 551(13).”102 
Moreover, the act the agency failed to take must be a “circumscribed, 
discrete agency action[].”103 Finally, the Court established that only ac-
tion which is “legally required” is subject to review under section 706(1) 
of the APA.104 To wit, the Court held that a challenge of agency inaction 
“can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a 
discrete agency action that it is required to take.”105
 Yet despite being a category of “agency action,” the Supreme Court 
in Heckler v. Chaney held that agency inaction is presumptively unreview-
able, stating that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, 
whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally com-
mitted to an agency’s absolute discretion.”106 This conclusion interprets 
                                                                                                                      
 
96 5 U.S.C. § 704 (emphasis added); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 
55, 61–62 (2004). Preliminary, procedural, and intermediate agency actions cannot be 
directly reviewed, but are reviewable upon review of final agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
97 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). 
98 Id. (citation omitted). 
99 Id. at 178. 
100 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). 
101 542 U.S. at 61. 
102 Id. at 62. 
103 Id. The Court described “discrete” actions as those categories enumerated in 5 
U.S.C. § 551(13). Id. The “limitation to discrete agency action precludes the kind of broad 
programmatic attack[s]” that “seek wholesale improvement [of agency programs] by court 
decree.” Id. at 64 (quotation omitted). 
104 Id. at 63. The Court held this requirement applied to actions “unreasonably de-
layed” because “a delay cannot be unreasonable with respect to action that is not re-
quired.” See id. at 63 n.1 (quotation omitted). 
105 Id. at 64. 
106 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). The court enunciated several justifications for creating 
this rebuttable presumption of unreviewability. See id. An agency is “far better equipped 
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section 701(a)(2) of the APA to preclude judicial review where an 
agency chooses not to act because this decision is “committed to agency 
discretion.”107 However, this presumption is rebuttable where the sub-
stantive statute provides guidelines for agency action.108 The Court 
stated that Congress could limit agency discretion not to act by “setting 
substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power 
to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.”109
 One commentator concluded that the Chaney Court recognized 
that statutory deadlines constitute such a limit by providing “law to ap-
ply” in circumstances where an agency refuses to act.110 This observation 
was born out in dicta in SUWA, which stated that agency action unlaw-
fully withheld included circumstances where “an agency is compelled by 
law to act within a certain time period.”111 Indeed, the Court’s defini-
tion of “failure to act” under the APA as “the omission of an action with-
out formally rejecting a request” included as an example “the failure to 
promulgate a rule or take some decision by a statutory deadline.”112
3. Deference to the Agency’s Interpretation of the Law 
 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test for reviewing an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute that it administers.113 First, the reviewing 
court determines “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.”114 If Congress’s intent is clear, this ends the inquiry 
and the “court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress.”115 If Congress was silent or am-
biguous, then the court must determine “whether the agency's answer 
                                                                                                                      
than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its pri-
orities.” Id. at 831–32. An agency does not exercise coercive power when it refuses to act 
and thus does not trench upon individual liberties or property rights that a court is nor-
mally called upon to protect. Id. at 832. An agency’s refusal to prosecute or enforce resem-
bles prosecutorial discretion, and thus should receive similar deference, given that agen-
cies typically rest in the executive branch. Id. 
107 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000); Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831. 
108 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832–33. 
109 Id. at 833. 
110 See Catherine Zaller, The Case for Strict Statutory Construction of Mandatory Agency 
Deadlines Under Section 706(1), 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1545, 1553–54 (2001). 
111 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 65 (2004). 
112 See id. at 63. 
113 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
114 Id. at 842. 
115 Id. at 842–43. 
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is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”116 Moreover, the 
Chevron decision stands for the principle that a reviewing court “may 
not substitute its own construction” of a statute if the agency’s interpre-
tation is permissible or reasonable.117 With regard to agency interpreta-
tion of the law, the Court held that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority 
on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative con-
structions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”118
B. Courts Regularly Overturn FWS’s “Not Prudent” and  
“Not Determinable” Findings 
 Between 1990 and 2005, federal courts overwhelmingly ruled 
against FWS and ordered the agency to designate critical habitat.119 A 
small sampling of this substantial body of case law indicates courts have 
been unreceptive to FWS’s arguments for not designating critical habi-
tat.120 The willingness of federal courts to overturn FWS’s determina-
tions reflects a significant departure from the deference normally ac-
corded to agency actions.121
1. Courts Set Aside “Not Prudent” Findings as “Arbitrary and 
Capricious” Agency Action 
 Courts have reviewed FWS’s “not prudent” findings as agency ac-
tion and applied the “arbitrary and capricious” standard set forth by sec-
tion 706(2)(A) of the APA to set them aside.122 In Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, the Fifth Circuit set aside a “not prudent” finding as 
                                                                                                                      
116 Id. at 843. 
117 Id. at 844. 
118 Id. at 843 n.9. 
119 Manson Testimony, supra note 69, at 29. “We have been inundated with lawsuits for 
our failure to designate critical habitat . . . . Almost universally, the courts have declined to 
grant relief.” Id. One statistical study covering the period between 1999 and 2005 indicates 
that FWS lost or settled cases which led to habitat designation for 373 species. See Par-
enteau, supra note 1, at 4 n.16 (spreadsheets on file with author). 
120 Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 445 (5th Cir. 2001); Forest 
Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999); Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1997) [NRDC v. DOI ]; Conserva-
tion Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Haw. 1998). 
121 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–16 (1984) (stat-
ing that agency actions are entitled to a presumption of regularity and courts cannot sub-
stitute their judgment for that of an agency); see also Scarpello, supra note 36, at 427 (argu-
ing courts do not rely on congressional intent that the “not prudent” exception be used 
rarely when they criticize FWS’s factual findings and evidence). 
122 Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 445; NRDC v. DOI, 113 F.3d at 1127; Conservation Council for 
Haw., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1288. 
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arbitrary and capricious because it relied on a facially invalid regulation 
promulgated by FWS.123 The regulation was invalidated, in part, because 
it increased the frequency with which FWS would find critical habitat 
designation “not prudent,” a “result . . . in tension with the avowed in-
tent of Congress that a ‘not prudent’ finding regarding critical habitat 
would only occur under ‘rare’ or ‘limited’ circumstances.”124
 The Ninth Circuit set aside a “not prudent” determination in Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Department of the Interior (NRDC v. 
DOI) on the grounds it was arbitrary and capricious because the FWS 
failed to “articulate a rational basis for invoking the rare imprudence 
exception.”125 The court also found FWS’s reasoning that critical habi-
tat designation would not be beneficial to most of the species reflected 
an “expansive construction of the ‘no benefit’ prong to the impru-
dence exception . . . inconsistent with clear congressional intent.”126 
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that Congress had intended the “not 
prudent” exception to be exercised rarely and only in extraordinary 
circumstances.127
 In Conservation Council for Hawai‘i v. Babbitt, the District of Hawaii 
set aside “not prudent” findings for 245 listed plant species as arbitrary 
and capricious.128 The district court held that FWS’s proffered ration-
                                                                                                                      
 
123 245 F.3d at 447. The regulation defined “destruction or adverse modification” as “a 
direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both 
the survival and recovery of a listed species.” Id. at 439. The court held this conflicted with 
the ESA, which defined critical habitat as including areas essential for the “conservation” 
of a species—“a much broader concept than mere survival.” Id. at 441–42.
124 Id. at 443. “In practice, the Services have inverted this intent, rendering critical 
habitat designation the exception and not the rule. The rarity of designation is attribut-
able, in part, to the manner in which the Services have defined the jeopardy and destruc-
tion/adverse modification standards.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
125 113 F.3d at 1127. At issue was FWS’s determination that critical habitat designation 
for the coastal California gnatcatcher was “not prudent” because identification posed an 
increased threat of deliberate destruction of gnatcatcher habitat by landowners and would 
not appreciably benefit the gnatcatcher. Id. at 1123. 
126 Id. at 1126. The court held that the Service provided inadequate explanation and 
evidence for its “increased threat” rationale, concluding this reflected a “fail[ure] to bal-
ance the pros and cons of designation” as expressly required by section 4 of the ESA. Id. at 
1125. 
127 Id. at 1126. One commentator has suggested that NRDC v. DOI could stand for the 
proposition that FWS’s stated policy that critical habitat provides little benefit conflicts 
with the law of the Ninth Circuit. McDonald, supra note 1, at 679. 
128 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Haw. 1998). FWS supported its “not prudent” finding 
with one or more of the following reasons: designation would increase the likelihood of 
illegal taking and vandalism, provide little benefit to most species primarily located on 
private land, and not increase government precautions for those species on federal land. 
Id. at 1283. The district court rejected all three rationales on reasoning similar to that of 
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ales for issuing “not prudent” determinations, particularly those which 
discounted the benefits of critical habitat designation, contravened 
congressional intent that the “not prudent” exception be used rarely.129 
The court concluded that in the case of all 245 listed plant species, FWS 
had failed to heed NRDC v. DOI’s command to make “a rational con-
nection between the facts found and the choice made.”130 The sheer 
number of “not prudent” findings set aside by Conservation Council for 
Hawai‘i is an extreme example of the willingness of courts to reject 
FWS’s reasoning where perceived as inconsistent with Congress’s intent 
that the “not prudent” finding be issued rarely.131
2. Courts Compel Designation of Critical Habitat Where FWS Failed to 
Act Within the Statutory Deadline After a “Not Determinable” 
Finding 
 Courts have compelled agency action under section 706(1) of the 
APA where FWS failed to designate critical habitat within the statutory 
deadline set by section 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) of the ESA after an initial 
finding of “not determinable.”132 The Tenth Circuit in Forest Guardians 
v. Babbitt held that by failing to designate critical habitat by the statutory 
deadline required by the ESA, the Secretary had unlawfully withheld 
agency action in violation of section 706(1) of the APA.133 The court 
concluded that where “Congress by organic statute sets a specific dead-
line for agency action, neither the agency nor any court has discretion 
. . . . [A] reviewing court must compel the action unlawfully with-
held.”134 The case was remanded to the district court with instructions 
that the Secretary be ordered to issue a final critical habitat designation 
“without regard to the Secretary’s other priorities under the ESA.”135
                                                                                                                      
NRDC v. DOI, chiefly relying on FWS’s perceived failures to provide adequate evidence and 
reasoning for each of the aforementioned rationales. Id. at 1283–87. 
129 See id. at 1285. 
130 Id. at 1286 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 113 F.3d 
1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
131 Id. at 1285. 
132 Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1190. The Secretary argued that resource limitations should justify failure to 
comply with the mandatory duties imposed by the ESA, but the court rejected this argu-
ment. Id. at 1188–89. 
135 Id. at 1193. 
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III. The Statute of Limitations and the Continuing  
Violations Doctrine 
 As previously noted, citizen suits against FWS for failure to desig-
nate critical habitat within the statutory deadline disproportionately 
succeed and are almost exclusively responsible for FWS’s designation.136 
However, several of these lawsuits have involved species listed many years 
ago and in these cases FWS argues that the statute of limitations bars 
claims where the final agency action—generally considered to be FWS’s 
conclusion that critical habitat is “not determinable” or “not prudent”— 
occurred more than six years prior to the filing of the case.137 In re-
sponse, citizen groups regularly argue that courts should apply the con-
tinuing violations doctrine to toll the statute of limitations.138
A. Statute of Limitations as a Term of Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
 As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit unless Con-
gress consents to a cause of action.139 The citizen suit provision of the 
ESA reflects just such consent, allowing “any person” to bring a civil suit 
against the Secretary for failure to perform any non-discretionary act 
or duty.140 Additionally, Congress has consented to suit for any agency 
action via section 702 of the APA, which provides that “[a] person suf-
fering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof.”141 However, the Supreme Court has 
held that Congress may set the terms of consent to be sued that define 
any court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.142
                                                                                                                      
136 Parenteau, supra note 1, at 4 n.16 (spreadsheets on file with author); see Manson 
Testimony, supra note 69, at 29 (noting that “[a]ll of the FY 2004 and FY 2005 proposed 
and final designations were the result of court orders or settlement agreements”). 
137 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2006); Inst. 
for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 07-CV-358-PK, 2007 WL 4117978, at *2 
(D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007); Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 813 (W.D. La. 
2007); S. Appalachian Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Servs., 181 F. Supp. 2d 
883, 885 (E.D. Tenn. 2001); Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Sec’y of the Interior, 158 F. Supp. 2d 
984, 988 (W.D. Mo. 2001). 
138 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 453 F.3d at 1333; Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 2007 WL 4117978, 
at *5; Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 817; S. Appalachian Biodiversity Project, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 
887; Nixon, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 989. 
139 United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). 
140 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(C) (2000). 
141 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). 
142 Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586. 
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 According to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), “every civil action commenced 
against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed 
within six years after the right of action first accrues.”143 The Supreme 
Court has ruled that the principal purpose of statutes of limitations is 
to “protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in 
which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evi-
dence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memo-
ries, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.”144 Where a statute 
creates a right for civil action against the federal government, the 
United States has waived its sovereign immunity, but this waiver is con-
ditioned on the applicability of a statute of limitations and courts 
“should not . . . extend the waiver beyond that which Congress in-
tended.”145 The Supreme Court has commanded that statutes of limita-
tions be strictly observed and not easily implied or overridden with ex-
ceptions.146
 However, in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, the Supreme 
Court held that the “rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling appli-
cable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits 
against the United States.”147 The Supreme Court concluded this gen-
eral rule was a “realistic assessment of legislative intent” that did not 
substantially broaden the congressional waiver in a federal statute of 
limitations.148 One situation provided as exemplary of when a court 
should allow equitable tolling was “where the complainant has been 
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the fil-
ing deadline to pass.”149 Irwin’s rebuttable presumption of equitable 
tolling of statutes of limitations generally supplants the Supreme 
Court’s prior ad hoc approach to determine when a statute of limita-
tions was subject to equitable tolling.150
 Significantly though, the Court recently held in John R. Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. United States that the rebuttable presumption in Irwin does 
not apply to statutes of limitations for which the Court “previously pro-
vided a definitive interpretation.”151 The Court identified two types of 
                                                                                                                      
143 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2000). 
144 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979). 
145 Id. at 117–18. 
146 Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957). 
147 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990). 
148 Id. at 95. 
149 Id. at 96. 
150 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 755 (2008). 
151 Id. 
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statutes of limitations.152 Most constitute an affirmative defense against 
stale or unduly delayed claims which are “subject to rules of forfeiture 
and waiver” and typically permit tolling “in light of special equitable 
considerations.”153 However, some are so-called “jurisdictional” statutes 
that seek to promote broader goals of administrability, limiting the 
scope of governmental waiver of sovereign immunity and promoting 
judicial efficiency.154 The Court opined that the time limits imposed by 
these “jurisdictional” statutes are construed “as more absolute” and less 
prone to equitable tolling.155
 The Supreme Court did not rule on the applicability of equitable 
tolling to 28 U.S.C. § 2401 prior to Irwin.156 Justice Ginsberg’s dissent in 
John R. Sand & Gravel noted that courts of appeals are divided on the 
“jurisdictional” nature of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) and that the majority’s 
decision “implies that Irwin governs the interpretation of all statutes we 
have not yet construed—including, presumably, the identically worded 
§ 2401.”157 Thus, it remains an open question whether the Irwin rebut-
table presumption would be applicable to § 2401.158 Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent noted that “Courts of Appeals have divided on the question [of] 
whether § 2401(a)’s [sic] limit is ‘jurisdictional.’”159
 While the Supreme Court has never expressly stated that the gen-
eral federal statute of limitations applies to federal agency actions, sev-
                                                                                                                      




156 John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 128 S. Ct. at 760-61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court 
held that because it had previously defined the Court of Claims statute of limitations as 
“jurisdictional” in nature, the decision in Irwin did not alter this long standing interpreta-
tion. Id. at 755 (majority opinion). Essentially, the “definitive earlier interpretation of the 
[Court of Claims] statute” rebutted the presumption of tolling Irwin set forth. Id. at 756. 
The Court concluded that “[b]asic principles of stare decisis” required it to recognize dif-
ferent interpretations of “different, but similarly worded, statutes,” rather than overrule its 
precedent. Id. 
157 Id. at 760–61. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
158 See id. 
159 John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 128 S. Ct. at 760 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). The Eleventh Circuit holds that 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) is jurisdictional. Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Spannaus v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The Ninth Circuit holds that 28 
U.S.C. § 2401(a) “is not jurisdictional, but is subject to waiver.” Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. 
Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit holds that “the doctrine of 
equitable tolling has potential application” to suits subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Clymore 
v. United States, 217 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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eral circuit courts have concluded that it does.160 The Ninth Circuit has 
held 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) applies to challenges of agency action under 
the APA and the District of Oregon relied on this for the purposes of a 
critical habitat designation challenge.161 The Eleventh Circuit has also 
concluded that that the general statute of limitations applies to the 
challenges brought under the ESA.162 The Western District of Missouri 
cited the Ninth Circuit when concluding the general statute of limita-
tions applies to the challenges of federal agency action.163 Finally, the 
Western District of Louisiana and Eastern District of Tennessee decided 
the general statute of limitations applies to agency failure to designate 
critical habitat.164
B. Continuing Violations Doctrine 
 The continuing violations doctrine tolls a statute of limitations 
where a claim in isolation would be time-barred, but subsequent viola-
tions restart the clock and prevent accrual.165 As noted by the Western 
District of Louisiana, “[t]he scope of the doctrine is unclear, and the 
United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue.”166 Courts 
have applied the continuing violations doctrine in the context of em-
ployment and civil-rights litigation.167 Several federal courts have also 
extended the continuing violations doctrine to apply in cases where 
plaintiffs allege agency noncompliance with statutory deadlines.168
 The Southern District of New York has held that where an agency 
fails to perform a non-discretionary duty under the Clean Water Act 
                                                                                                                      
160 See Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 1997); Wind River Mining Corp. 
v. United States, 946 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1991); Geyen v. Marsh, 775 F.2d 1303, 1307 
(5th Cir. 1985). 
161 Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 07-CV-358-PK, 2007 WL 
4117978, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007). 
162 See Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1334. 
163 Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Sec’y of the Interior, 158 F. Supp. 2d 984, 988 (W.D. Mo. 
2001). 
164 Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 809 (W.D. La. 2007); S. Appala-
chian Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Servs., 181 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2001). 
165 Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 817. 
166 Id. 
167 Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 07-CV-358-PK, 2007 WL 
4117978, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007). 
168 Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 588–89 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Am. Canoe Ass’n 
v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 925 (E.D. Va. 1998); Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. 153, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Contra Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 2007 WL 
4117978, at *4 (stating that Ninth Circuit “has not considered whether to extend [the con-
tinuing violations doctrine] to the environmental context”). 
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(CWA), a claim to compel action “is not subject to any statute of limita-
tions.”169 The Fox court held that a state’s ongoing failure to adhere to 
a provision of the CWA “creates a continuing duty of the Administrator 
[of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)] to disapprove of the 
state’s actions.”170 Thus, although the initial act triggering the Adminis-
trator’s duty occurred outside of the statute of limitations, the contin-
ued failure to act constituted a continuing violation.171 In another case 
concerning the CWA, the Eastern District of Virginia applied the con-
tinuing violations doctrine to toll the statute of limitations and allow a 
claim against the EPA for unreasonable delay under section 706(1) of 
the APA.172 Similar to Fox, the Eastern District of Virginia concluded 
that EPA’s delay despite “clear and specific time limits for agency ac-
tion” constituted a continuing violation which could be challenged at 
any time so long as the delay continued.173
 The D.C. Circuit has “repeatedly refused to hold that actions seek-
ing relief under [section 706(1) of the APA] to ‘compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed’ are time-barred if initi-
ated more than six years after an agency fails to meet a statutory dead-
line.”174 Challenges of agency inaction are not barred because they do 
“not complain about what the agency has done but rather about what 
the agency has yet to do.”175
C. Some Courts Apply the Statute of Limitations to Bar Challenges to Compel 
Critical Habitat Designation 
 The Eleventh Circuit and Western District of Missouri have held 
that 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) bars challenges to FWS’s failure to designate 
critical habitat filed after the six-year statutory deadline.176
                                                                                                                      
169 Fox, 909 F. Supp. at 159. The claim concerned a statutory duty under the Clean Wa-
ter Act requiring the Environmental Protection Agency to approve state water-quality stan-
dards and, upon disapproval, establish standards for the state. Id. at 157. 
170 Id. at 160. 
171 See id. 
172 Am. Canoe Ass’n, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 925. 
173 Id. at 925 & n.25. 
174 Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
175 Id. at 589 (citation omitted). 
176 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1335–36 (11th Cir. 2006); 
Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Sec’y of the Interior, 158 F. Supp. 2d 984, 990 (W.D. Mo. 2001) 
(finding that the statute of limitations barred the challenge under review). 
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1. One Court Has Held a “Not Prudent” or “Not Determinable” 
Finding Constitutes Final Agency Action That Starts the Clock for 
Statute of Limitations Purposes 
 In Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Secretary of the Interior, the Western District 
of Missouri concluded that the statute of limitations barred a challenge 
to compel critical habitat designation more than six years after FWS had 
issued “not prudent” findings for two species.177 The court construed 28 
U.S.C. § 2401(a) “not [as] a waivable defense, but a jurisdictional one” 
and stated it was “to be strictly observed and not easily implied or over-
ridden with exceptions.”178 The court held that FWS’s publication of the 
“not prudent” determinations constituted final agency action subject to 
challenge.179 The court concluded that the statute of limitations began 
to run at the time of a regulation’s publication and plaintiff’s complaint 
was filed well beyond the six year period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2401(a), and was therefore barred.180
 The Nixon court rejected the State of Missouri’s argument that sec-
tion 706(1) of the APA applied in the instant case because the “not 
prudent” determination constituted affirmative agency action and 
could be challenged once made.181 The Nixon court distinguished 
American Canoe, explaining that the statute of limitations was tolled in 
that case because the unreasonable agency delay constituted a continu-
ing violation of the relevant statute.182 The Nixon court further distin-
guished Forest Guardians v. Babbitt on the grounds that FWS had not 
made a critical habitat determination and that the statute of limitations 
issue was not raised in that case.183 The court found that in each case, 
                                                                                                                      
 
177 158 F. Supp. 2d at 986, 990. The two species at issue were the least tern and the pal-
lid sturgeon. Id. at 986. 
178 Id. at 988. 
179 Id. at 989. Notably, the FWS also issued a “not determinable” finding for the pallid 
sturgeon. Id. at 986. 
180 Id. at 988–89. 
181 Id. at 989. 
182 Id. (citing Am. Canoe Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 925 
(E.D. Va. 1998)). 
183 Nixon, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 990 (citing Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 
1182 (10th Cir. 1999)). It appears that the Western District of Missouri misconstrued the 
facts of Forest Guardians, stating no decision concerning critical habitat designation was 
made in that case when, in fact, the Service in Forest Guardians had issued a “not determin-
able” finding. See id. Contra Forest Guardians, 174 F.3d at 1182. The “not determinable” find-
ing is a preliminary agency decision which “allows the Secretary a grace period in which to 
designate a critical habitat.” Steven J. Blair, Casenote, Forcing the Issue: Applying a Statute of 
Limitations to Challenges of Agency Inaction Under the Endangered Species Act, 6 Mo. Envtl. L & 
Pol’y Rev. 53, 63 (2002). Under section 704 of the APA, preliminary, procedural, or in-
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the agency concerned had not made a decision, whereas FWS’s “not 
prudent” determination constituted a final decision that triggered the 
statute of limitations.184
 The court considered it significant that the plaintiff’s complaint 
did not allege the Service unreasonably delayed action in violation of 
section 706(1) of the APA.185 The court stated that the “bifurcated 
structure” of section 706 indicated Congress’s understanding that 
“there is a distinction between a failure to act and acting in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner.”186 Accordingly, FWS’s decision to issue “not 
prudent” findings constituted affirmative action challengeable as arbi-
trary and capricious under section 706(2)(A), not a failure to act under 
section 706(1).187 The Western District of Missouri concluded that “a 
finding of ‘not determinable’ or ‘not prudent’ starts the statute of limi-
tation to run at the time the decision is made” because either finding 
constitutes final agency action.188
2. One Court Has Held FWS’s Failure to Act Within the Statutory 
Deadline Set by 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C) Starts the Clock for 
Statute of Limitations Purposes 
 In Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that the continuing violations doctrine does not toll the statute of limita-
tions in challenges of agency failure to designate critical habitat within 
the statutory deadline set by 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C).189 In this case, 
concerning “not determinable” findings for two species, the Secretary 
failed to designate critical habitat within the statutory deadline.190 The 
only issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the Secretary’s fail-
ure to designate critical habitat was a “continuing violation.”191 The 
court reasoned that “nothing in the language of the [ESA]” supported a 
                                                                                                                      
termediate agency actions cannot be directly reviewed, but are reviewable upon review of 
final agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). 
184 Nixon, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 5 U.S.C. § 706; Nixon, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
188 Nixon, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 989–90. One commentator argues that the court “need-
lessly extend[ed] the holding to include the ‘not determinable’ exception.” Blair, supra 
note 183, at 64. 
189 453 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006). 
190 Id. at 1334. 
191 Id. 
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finding that the agency’s failure to designate critical habitat within the 
statutory deadline constituted a continuing violation.192
 The Eleventh Circuit interpreted 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C) as 
“creat[ing] not an ongoing duty, but a fixed point in time at which vio-
lation for the failure of the Secretary to act [arose].”193 As such, the 
Secretary’s failure to designate critical habitat was a single violation that 
accrued on the day after the deadline passed.194 The court also inter-
preted language in 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C) requiring the Secretary 
to rely on “such data as may be available at the [sic] time” when designat-
ing critical habitat as indicative of Congress’s intent that the duty was 
not ongoing.195 The court concluded that finding an ongoing duty 
would make this provision “anomalous” because it would effectively bar 
the Secretary from considering new information after the deadline.196
 The Eleventh Circuit found that such an interpretation was a 
proper limitation on the scope of applicability of the continuing viola-
tions doctrine.197 The court distinguished between the continuing ef-
fects of a discrete violation and continuing violations, categorizing the 
failure to designate critical habitat within the deadline as the former.198 
Moreover, the court stated that application of the continuing violations 
doctrine is limited to situations where “a reasonably prudent plaintiff 
would have been unable to determine that a violation had oc-
curred.”199 The court held that the Secretary’s failure to act by the 
statutory deadline would have made the reasonably prudent person 
aware that a violation had occurred, and therefore, “the continuing 
violation doctrine does not apply.”200
 The Hamilton court further concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) is a 
“jurisdictional condition attached to the government’s waiver of sover-
                                                                                                                      
192 Id. at 1335. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006); see 
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2000). 
196 Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335. 
197 Id. at 1334–35. 
198 Id. at 1335. “The Center complains of the continuing effects of the failure of the 
Secretary to determine the critical habitat by the statutory deadline, a one-time violation 
under the Act.” Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. One commentator states that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit’s holding places the bur-
den on citizen groups and private plaintiffs . . . to monitor and enforce the [ESA]. While 
governmental oversight by watchdog groups should be encouraged, the responsibility to 
enforce the law lies with the government, not the advocacy groups.” Stephen Butler, Cen-
ter for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton: Eviscerating the Citizen Suit Provision of the Endangered 
Species Act?, 34 Ecology L.Q. 1137, 1143 (2007). 
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eign immunity, and as such must be strictly construed.”201 The court 
cited Supreme Court and courts of appeals precedent for the proposi-
tion that 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) is a waiver of sovereign immunity which 
must be “strictly observed [with] exceptions thereto . . . not to be im-
plied.”202 Since 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) “unambiguously imposes a six-year 
statute of limitations,” the court concluded that barring the application 
of the continuing violations doctrine was consistent “with principles of 
sovereign immunity.”203 Notably, Hamilton was cited in Justice Gins-
berg’s dissent in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. as reflective of the “theoreti-
cal incoherence and practical confusion” which surrounds the question 
of whether 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) is “jurisdictional” or whether Irwin’s 
rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applies.204
 The Hamilton court also noted that the existence of an alternative 
remedy further indicated Congress did not intend for the continuing 
violations doctrine to apply.205 The alternative remedy available to 
plaintiffs was to petition the Secretary to designate critical habitat un-
der 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(d).206 The court made clear that even the ab-
sence of an alternative remedy would not prompt them to create an 
exception to the statute of limitations.207
D. Cases That Toll the Statute of Limitations to Allow Challenges to Compel 
Critical Habitat Designation 
 Three federal district courts have tolled the statute of limitations to 
allow challenges against FWS for failure to designate critical habitat 
within the statutory deadline set by 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C).208 Sev-
eral courts have held that FWS’s failure constitutes a continuing viola-
                                                                                                                      
201 Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1334 (citing Spannaus v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 55 
(D.C. Cir. 1987)). The D.C. Circuit “recently expressed doubt about the jurisdictional na-
ture” of a statute “analogous” to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Harris v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 353 
F.3d 1006, 1013 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. 
v. United States describes the holding in Harris as “recognizing that Irwin may have under-
mined [D.C.] Circuit precedent holding that § 2401(a) is ‘jurisdictional.’” 128 S. Ct. 750, 
761 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
202 Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335(citations omitted). 
203 Id. at 1335–36. 
204 John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 128 S. Ct. 750, 760 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
205 453 F.3d at 1336. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 07-CV-358-PK, 2007 WL 
4117978, at *6 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007); Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 821 
(W.D. La. 2007); S. Appalachian Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Servs., 181 F. 
Supp. 2d 883, 887 (E.D. Tenn. 2001). 
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tion of its statutory duty that resets the statute of limitations clock.209 
One court also held that FWS’s failure to act does not provide con-
cerned parties “actual or constructive knowledge” of a right of action 
and thus does not start the clock for statute of limitations purposes.210 
Additionally, one court has held 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) does not apply to 
challenges of FWS’s inaction because the agency exceeds its statutory 
authority under the ultra vires doctrine.211
1. Several Courts Have Held Failure to Designate Critical Habitat 
Before the Statutory Deadline After a “Not Determinable” Finding Is 
a Continuing Violation That Tolls the Statute of Limitations 
 The Eastern District of Tennessee tolled 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) and 
compelled the FWS to designate critical habitat for nine species be-
cause the agency’s failure to designate critical habitat within the statu-
tory deadline after an initial finding of “not determinable” constituted 
a continuing violation.212 Every day that FWS failed to fulfill its statu-
tory duty constituted a new violation of that duty and caused the statute 
of limitations to run anew.213 The court acknowledged that Congress 
had failed to adequately fund FWS to carry out its statutory duty to des-
ignate critical habitat. As a result, the Service “finds itself confronted 
with a plethora of suits and injunctions” which require it to “devote its 
limited resources to comply with judicial orders at the expense of cur-
tailing or even abandoning its search for as-yet-unidentified endan-
gered species.”214 However, the court stated that “non-repeal of 16 
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C) . . . must be presumed to be an indication of 
Congress’s wishes.”215 Effectively, the continuing violations doctrine was 
applied to prevent the statute of limitations from ever commencing to 
run.216
 Similarly, in Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, the Western District of Louisi-
ana held FWS’s failure to designate critical habitat within the statutory 
                                                                                                                      
209 Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 2007 WL 4117978, at *6; Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 821; S. 
Appalachian Biodiversity Project, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 887. 
210 Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 816. 
211 Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 2007 WL 4117978 at *5. 
212 See S. Appalachian Biodiversity Project, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 885, 887. The case con-
cerned sixteen species total, seven of which had been issued “not prudent” findings. How-
ever, FWS admitted that the appropriate criteria had not been used to make the “not pru-
dent” determinations and requested voluntary remand to reconsider them. Id. at 885. 
213 Id. at 887. 
214 Id. at 886. 
215 Id. at 887. 
216 Id. 
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deadline after an initial finding of “not determinable” constituted a 
continuing violation that prevented accrual of the statute of limita-
tions.217 The Schoeffler court held that the statute of limitations did not 
bar the plaintiffs’ challenge on other grounds described below, but 
nonetheless addressed the applicability of the continuing violations 
doctrine.218 The court explained that “[o]nly continuous unlawful acts 
or a series of separate wrongful actions can form the basis of a continu-
ing violation,” as distinguished from “a discrete one-time violation with 
lingering effects or consequences.”219
 The court opined that “the Secretary’s ongoing and continuous 
failure to perform his non-discretionary duty . . . constituted an action-
able violation of the ESA” and that the duty continued “until the final 
regulation is published.”220 Thus, the court held “the Secretary’s viola-
tion is ongoing and does not constitute a discrete one-time violation 
with lingering effects or consequences.”221 Moreover, the court noted 
that “[t]he Secretary’s representations and attempted proposals effec-
tively link[ed] conduct” during the initial violation and limitation pe-
riod with conduct leading up to the filing of the litigation.222
 The Schoeffler court further announced that “[n]othing in the lan-
guage of the ESA indicates that Congress intended that the Secretary’s 
mandatory duty to designate critical habitat be discharged when the 
Secretary first fails to abide by a deadline.”223 The court opined that “to 
hold that the Secretary is only responsible for timely performance,” 
and that his failure to designate within the statutory deadline only vio-
lated the law “for an instant of time at the passing of the deadline and 
no more once the deadline passed,” would contradict Congress’s intent 
and the goals of the ESA.224 Therefore, the court reasoned, where the 
                                                                                                                      
217 See 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 821 (2007). FWS listed the Louisiana black bear as a threat-
ened species on January 7, 1992, and stated its critical habitat was “not . . . determinable,” 
invoking 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C) to extend the deadline for determination by one year. 
Id. at 810. Over the next two years, the Secretary made proposals to designate critical habi-
tat on several occasions, culminating in a September 27, 1995 publication of a recovery 
plan that stated designation of the bear’s critical habitat was in progress and under review. 
Id. at 810–11. No further action was taken by FWS to designate and publish the bear’s criti-
cal habitat. Id. at 811. 
218 Id. at 817. 
219 Id. at 818–19. 
220 Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 820. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 823. 
224 Id. “It is nonsensical that Congress intended that endangered animals be left un-
protected simply because the time by which the protection should have been provided 
passed.” Id. at 823–24. 
526 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:497 
Secretary has a mandatory, non-discretionary duty to act, “it is logical 
and equitable that the citizen suit provision should also still be available 
to compel the required performance.”225 To rule otherwise would ef-
fectively give FWS the power to evade its duty with impunity, thereby 
effectively repealing the statutory mandate.226
 In Institute for Wildlife Protection, the District of Oregon held that 
“each day that FWS does not act” within the statutory deadline after a 
“not determinable” finding “is a discrete, single violation of the 
ESA.”227 The Institute for Wildlife Protection court found the reasoning of 
the D.C. Circuit persuasive concerning challenges to agency inaction, 
namely that the statute of limitations was inapplicable where plaintiffs 
were not complaining about “what the agency has done but rather 
about what the agency has yet to do.”228 The court advised that any 
statute of limitations is “grounded in equity and based on the principles 
of avoiding stale claims, achieving finality, and protecting those who 
rely on the law.”229 The District of Oregon concluded that these princi-
ples “are not advanced by and do not support barring claims that seek 
to hold an agency accountable for actions it is required by statute to 
perform.”230
 Thus, the court held that 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) creates an 
“ongoing, binding statutory duty to designate critical habitat” and that 
“there is nothing in the ESA to indicate that FWS’s duty . . . is finite or 
expires at a certain point.”231 The court cited other language in the rele-
vant statute that supported a conclusion that FWS’s duty was an ongoing 
one.232 The court concluded it would not apply 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) to 
                                                                                                                      
 
225 Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 824. 
226 Id. 
227 Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 07-CV-358-PK, 2007 WL 
4117978, at *6 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007). FWS listed the Oregon Chub on October 18, 1993, 
at which time the Service deferred designation for an additional year pursuant to 16 
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii). Id. at *2. FWS did not make a critical habitat designation and 
admitted its failure to comply with the statute. Id. at *1. 
228 Id. at *5 (internal citations omitted). 
229 Id. 
230 Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 2007 WL 4117978, at *5. “‘[A]pplication of a statute of limita-
tions to a claim of unreasonable delay is grossly inappropriate, in that it would mean that 
[FWS] could immunize its allegedly unreasonable delay from judicial review simply by 
extending that delay for six years.’” Id. at *5 (quoting Am. Canoe Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 925 (E.D. Va. 1998)). 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) “requires FWS to perform periodic status reviews of [listed] 
species to monitor [their] improvement or decline” and 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(ii) pro-
vides that the agency may intermittently revise existing critical habitat designations. Id. Addi-
tionally, the District of Oregon found that the broad waiver of sovereign immunity that Sec-
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“nullify, in effect, FWS’s ongoing duty . . . and to insulate the agency 
from challenges to any continued inaction.”233
2. One Court Has Held that FWS’s Failure to Act Does Not Provide 
“Actual or Constructive Notice” of a Cause of Action and Does Not 
Start the Accrual of the Statute of Limitations 
 The Schoeffler court tolled 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) and compelled FWS 
to designate critical habitat on the grounds that the Secretary’s failure 
to designate critical habitat by the deadline neither “carr[ied] the 
weight of a definitive statement of the agency’s position,” nor gave “ac-
tual or constructive notice of a right of action.”234 Hence, the plaintiff’s 
cause of action did not accrue upon the initial violation of the dead-
line.235 In the Fifth Circuit, a cause of action accrues when a party has 
either actual or constructive knowledge of the violation and a right to 
enforce his claim.236 The Schoeffler court concluded that if FWS issued a 
“not prudent” decision or designated critical habitat, either would have 
constituted final agency action “concretely and definitively affecting the 
plaintiffs’ interest, thus triggering the statute of limitations.”237 Instead, 
the Secretary “maintained the interim ‘not yet determinable’ finding 
and by all appearances and representations, has further extended the 
course of investigation into the matter.”238 Thus, the FWS’s obligation 
to make a determination “remained open pending a final determina-
tion.”239 The court held “[p]laintiffs could not have inferred . . . that 
the defendant’s ongoing failure to finalize a habitat determination 
should be perceived as a situation of adverse action, rather than bu-
reaucratic bungling or foot dragging.”240
                                                                                                                      
tion 1540 of the ESA grants “counsels against a mechanical application of the statute of limi-
tations.” Id. 
233 Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 2007 WL 4117978, at *6. 
234 Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 816 (W.D. La. 2007). 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 815 (construing Vigman v. Cmty. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 635 F.2d 455, 459 
(5th Cir. 1981)). 
237 Id. at 816. 
238 Id. at 815. The court found that the Secretary’s actions subsequent to listing the 
bear— “proposing rules, accepting public comments, holding public hearings, and even 
promising designation would be forthcoming” — “confirmed plaintiffs’ reasonable, good 
faith belief that the Secretary would ultimately comply with the law, even if at a time after 
the statutory deadline.” Id. 
239 Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 815. 
240 Id. at 816. 
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3. One Court Has Held that FWS’s Failure to Act Constitutes Ultra Vires 
Action 
 In Institute for Wildlife Protection, the District of Oregon also con-
cluded that the statute of limitations is inapplicable to challenges of 
FWS’s failure to designate critical habitat within the statutory deadline 
after a “not determinable” finding because it constitutes agency action 
“ultra vires; i.e., in excess of its statutory authority.”241 The District of 
Oregon stated that the Ninth Circuit had recognized an exception to 
the application of the statute of limitations where an agency acted in 
excess of its statutory authority.242 The District of Oregon concluded 
that FWS lacked the discretion to ignore its mandatory, statutory duty 
and that its continuing “noncompliance with the ESA exceeds its statu-
tory authority.”243 As such, the court held 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) did not 
apply to plaintiff’s challenge to compel critical habitat designation.244
IV. Should the Statute of Limitations Be Tolled? 
 There are significant policy justifications for subjecting alleged 
abuse of the “not prudent” or “not determinable” exception by FWS to 
judicial review despite accrual of the statute of limitations—namely to 
prevent the agency from ignoring its statutory duties, thereby under-
mining clear congressional intent.245 Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) 
should be construed as subject to the rebuttable presumption of equi-
table tolling the Supreme Court announced in Irwin v. Department of 
Veterans Affairs.246 However, procedural differences between the two 
exceptions dictate that the statute of limitations bars challenges of a 
“not prudent” finding, but it should not bar challenges of agency fail-
ure to designate within the statutory deadline after a “not determin-
able” finding.247
                                                                                                                      
 
241 Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 07-CV-358-PK, 2007 WL 
4117978, at *6 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007). Ultra vires is “[a]n act performed without any au-
thority to act on subject.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1522 (6th ed. 1990). 
242 Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 2007 WL 4117978, at *6 (citing Wind River Mining Corp. v. 
United States, 946 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 See Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 443 (5th Cir. 2001); Natu-
ral Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Con-
servation Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1285 (D. Haw. 1998). 
246 See 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990); Clymore v. United States, 217 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 
2000); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1997). 
247 See Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 2007 WL 4117978, at *6; Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. 
Supp. 2d 805, 816, 822 (W.D. La. 2007); S. Appalachian Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Fish & 
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A. Significant Policy Considerations Are Implicated by Application of the 
Statute of Limitations to Bar Challenges of FWS’s “Not Prudent”  
and “Not Determinable” Exceptions 
 FWS has employed the “not prudent” and “not determinable” ex-
ceptions with such frequency that it has, for all intents and purposes, 
adopted a policy against critical habitat designation.248 This reflects its 
stated belief that “designation of ‘official’ critical habitat is of little addi-
tional value for most listed species.”249 This is in direct derogation of 
Congress’s intent that “in most situations the Secretary will, in fact, des-
ignate critical habitat at the same time that a species is listed as either 
endangered or threatened.”250 As observed by the Fifth Circuit, “[i]n 
practice, the Services have inverted [Congress’s] intent, rendering 
critical habitat designation the exception and not the rule.”251
 The extent to which courts have set aside FWS’s findings and com-
pelled the agency to designate critical habitat indicates a rejection of 
FWS’s devaluation of designation.252 Moreover, FWS has acknowledged 
it has no scientific evidence to support its conclusions about the utility 
of critical habitat designation.253 However, one recent survey of scien-
tific studies indicates that “species with critical habitat are in fact recov-
ering faster than those without it.”254 Strict application of the statute of 
limitations could bar hundreds of species from ever receiving a critical 
habitat designation.255 As stated by the Southern District of New York in 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fox, where an agency “charged with a 
duty by Congress . . . cannot be forced by the Court to carry out its duty 
because of a statute of limitations, the practical result is a repeal of the 
mandatory duty itself.”256
                                                                                                                      
Wildlife Servs., 181 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887 (E.D. Tenn. 2001); Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Sec’y 
of the Interior, 158 F. Supp. 2d 984, 990 (W.D. Mo. 2001). 
248 See Parenteau, supra note 1, at 1–2, & n.6. “[FWS has] taken a hard line position 
against designating critical habitat, not just at the time of listing, but ever.” Id. at 1–2. 
249 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Notice of Intent To Clarify the 
Role of Habitat in Endangered Species Conservation, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,871, 31,872 ( June 
14, 1999). 
250 H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9466.
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252 See, e.g., id.; Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 
1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Conservation Council for Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1285 
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B. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) Should Be Subject to Irwin’s Rebuttable  
Presumption of Equitable Tolling 
 The rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling of statutes of limi-
tations in suits against the government established by Irwin should apply 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).257 The Court’s recent decision in John R. Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. United States—which held that a “definitive earlier interpre-
tation of the statute [of limitations]” as “jurisdictional” in nature rebuts 
this presumption of equitable tolling—bolsters this conclusion.258 As 
Justice Ginsburg stated, the Court’s holding in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. 
“implies that Irwin governs the interpretation of all statutes we have not 
yet construed—including, presumably . . . [28 U.S.C.] § 2401.”259 In-
deed, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits have held that 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) is 
subject to the rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling.260 The Elev-
enth Circuit’s conclusion in Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton that 
28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) is “jurisdictional” failed to even mention Irwin and 
relied on a D.C. Circuit decision recently called into doubt by the D.C. 
Circuit itself.261 Applying Irwin’s rebuttable presumption of equitable 
tolling to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) would allow application of the continuing 
violations doctrine to toll the statutes of limitations.262
C. Despite Policy Concerns, a “Not Prudent” Determination Should Start the 
Clock for Statute of Limitations Purposes. 
 Although FWS’s overuse of the “not prudent” exception under-
mines clear congressional intent that it be exercised rarely, publication 
does properly start the clock for statute of limitations purposes.263 A 
“not prudent” finding constitutes final agency action challengeable as 
arbitrary and capricious under section 706(2) of the APA upon final 
                                                                                                                      
257 See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990). 
258 See 128 S. Ct. 750, 756–57 (2008). 
259 Id. at 760–61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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261 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006); 
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262 See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. 
263 See Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 816 (W.D. La. 2007); Missouri ex 
rel. Nixon v. Sec’y of the Interior, 158 F. Supp. 2d 984, 989 (W.D. Mo. 2001); H.R. Rep. No. 
95-1625, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9466.
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publication.264 The ESA sets forth no deadline requiring designation of 
critical habitat after a “not prudent” finding and the decision can stand 
indefinitely absent challenge.265 In issuing a “not prudent” finding, the 
agency takes an affirmative action that can be challenged immediately 
upon its issuance.266 As such, because the “not prudent” determination 
“concretely and definitively affect[s]” the interests of a would-be plain-
tiff, it starts the clock for the purposes of the statute of limitations.267
 This comports with the Fifth Circuit’s understanding that a cause 
of action accrues for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when “a party 
has either actual or constructive knowledge of the violation and a right 
to enforce his claim.”268 The publication of a final rule by the Secretary 
containing a “not prudent” finding is an event which signals to con-
cerned observers that a listed species has not received the protections 
of critical habitat.269 Moreover, a “not prudent” determination may 
serve as the Secretary’s ultimate decision regarding a species’s critical 
habitat and constitutes a fulfillment of his statutory duty.270 This makes 
the Secretary’s “not prudent” determination more like a single, discrete 
violation of the ESA with lingering effects, as compared to a continuing 
violation of his ongoing duty.271 Thus, the clock starts with such a de-
termination for statute of limitations purposes.272
D. Failure to Act Within the Statutory Deadline After a “Not Determinable” 
Finding Should Not Start the Clock for Statute of Limitations Purposes 
 By contrast, the Secretary’s failure to designate critical habitat 
within the statutory timeline created by 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C) after 
a “not determinable” finding is a “failure to act” challengeable under 
both section 706(1) of the APA and section 1540(g)(1)(C) of the citi-
                                                                                                                      
264 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th 
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zen suit provision of the ESA.273 The ESA establishes a mandatory dead-
line after the Secretary exercises the “not determinable” exception; at 
deadline’s end, the Secretary must either make a “not prudent” finding 
or designate critical habitat.274 FWS acknowledges that the “not deter-
minable” exception is an interim decision that only temporarily delays 
its duty to designate critical habitat.275
 The fact that 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C) has not been repealed or 
augmented and “unequivocally directs the Service to designate critical 
habitat . . . must be presumed to be an indication of Congress’s 
wishes.”276 The ESA establishes a nondiscretionary, mandatory duty 
which requires FWS to designate critical habitat to the maximum ex-
tent prudent within one year of issuing a “not determinable” finding.277 
In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Society, the Supreme Court stated 
that section 706(1) of the APA permits review where “an agency failed 
to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”278 Here, where 
“Congress by organic statute sets a specific deadline for agency action 
. . . [t]he agency must act by the deadline.”279
 Challenges of FWS’s failure to designate critical habitat within the 
statutory deadline should not be time-barred because the plaintiff 
“does not complain about what the agency has done but rather about 
what the agency has yet to do.”280 “[T]he principles that underlie the 
purpose of a statute of limitations are not advanced by and do not sup-
port barring claims that seek to hold an agency accountable for actions 
it is required by statute to perform.”281 Moreover, the statute of limita-
tions should be tolled because the Secretary’s ongoing failure to per-
                                                                                                                      
273 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000); Endangered Species 
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form his statutory duty to designate critical habitat within the deadline 
prescribed by section 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) of the ESA constitutes a con-
tinuing violation.282 The agency’s failure to act does not resemble final 
agency action, particularly where the Secretary often takes subsequent 
steps which suggest to concerned citizens that the agency may eventu-
ally take the appropriate action.283 Indeed, because it prevents con-
cerned parties from having “actual or constructive knowledge” of the 
violation and a right to enforce their claim, the continuing violations 
doctrine is appropriately applied.284
 Schoeffler is exemplary of this scenario, where FWS engaged in on-
going proposals and made gestures which the plaintiffs believed indi-
cated that a critical habitat designation would be forthcoming.285 As 
such, strict application of the statute of limitations unfairly punishes citi-
zen groups for relying upon FWS’s assertions.286 As argued by one 
commentator, strict application of the statute of limitations places un-
due responsibility for enforcement of the ESA on private citizens and 
advocacy groups.287 The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that a “reasonably 
prudent plaintiff would have been aware of the failure of the Secretary 
to act on the day following the deadline” ignores the troubled history of 
critical habitat designation and inaccurately construes the agency’s inac-
tion to constitute final agency action.288 Moreover, such an argument 
also punishes the agency by discouraging cooperation with citizen 
groups that may yield designation of critical habitat without litigation.289
Conclusion 
 FWS’s unofficial policy against designation of critical habitat has 
left the majority of endangered and threatened species without the ad-
ditional protections Congress intended for them to have. Only legal 
action by concerned citizens groups has been effective in forcing the 
agency to fulfill its statutory mandate under the ESA. Unfortunately for 
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those who believe in the added protections critical habitat designation 
affords, it appears that the general federal statute of limitations effec-
tively shields FWS from suit where it has abused the “not prudent” find-
ing. 
 However, FWS’s failure to designate critical habitat after the statu-
tory deadline set by section 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) of the ESA justifies equi-
table tolling. The Supreme Court has arguably established a rebuttable 
presumption that equitable tolling applies in suits against the United 
States. Moreover, courts have stated FWS’s failure to designate critical 
habitat violates clear congressional intent. Where, after a “not deter-
minable” finding, FWS subsequently fails to designate critical habitat 
within the deadline prescribed by section 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) of the 
ESA, courts should toll the statute of limitations by application of the 
continuing violations doctrine. This conclusion furthers the purposes 
of the ESA by ensuring FWS does not avoid its statutory responsibility 
to designate critical habitat. 
